The present study was concerned with the dynamic nature of memory schemata and the extent to which cognitive style may relate to recall accuracy. Evidence from several sources (Anderson, Spiro, & Ander son, 1978; Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Pi-. chert & Anderson, 1977; Royer & Cable, 1976; Sulin & Dooling, 1974) supports the notion that information is assimilated into existing knowledge structures (schemata). From the perspective of schema theory (e.g., Piaget, 1952 ), a knowledge structure should provide a framework not only for the as similation of related information consistent with its content but also for the accommo dation of its content to related but disparate information.
The issue of accommodation has impor tant implications for education, some of which have been suggested by Anderson (1977) . In terms of schema theory, all knowledge acquisition is viewed as modifi cation and differentiation of existing sche mata. If the goals of education involve the change of knowledge, then we must be con cerned with the modification of existing schemata when confronted with information requiring varying degrees of accommodation. Furthermore, educational theory must be concerned with individual differences that
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are predictive of the degree to which existing schemata assimilate or accommodate con flicting new inputs.
In an attempt to systematically investigate mechanisms of schema change, Spiro (1975 Spiro ( , 1977 argued that varying the type of sub sequent information should affect the degree of error in what is remembered about the original event. For some subjects, he pre sented incidental subsequent information that was either consistent with or contra dictory to information in a story that subjects had previously read, predicting transformational errors in story recall for only those subjects who heard contradictory information. Half of Spiro's subjects re ceived memory instructions, whereas the others were deceived into believing that they would be asked to evaluate the material at a later time. Since memory instructions de mand isolation of passage information, er rors were predicted for the deception con dition only. Retention was tested after 2 days, 3 weeks, or 6 weeks. Following story recall, all subjects were asked to rate each sentence in their recall protocol, according to their degree of confidence that it accu rately represented information stated in the original story.
As expected, Spiro found that all subjects in the memory condition and those deceived subjects who heard consistent subsequent information were essentially accurate in their recall. However, after long retention intervals (3 or 6 weeks), the deceived subjects 133 who heard contradictory information made errors that reflected the nature of that in formation. When similarly treated subjects were tested after 2 days, these errors did not occur. Therefore, schemata were not im mediately modified by the presentation of the subsequent information. Rather, during the passage of time, subjects may have lost the ability to distinguish information pre sented in the story from information inferred from the "aside" that was delivered subse quently. This loss of ability may result from confusion, or it may reflect hypothesized changes in the story schema.
A stage analysis (cf. Crowder, 1976) of the locus of schema change would indicate that the effects in Spiro's experiment occurred during information storage or at the time of retrieval. Confidence ratings were obtained to address this issue. The subjects who had heard contradictory information and were tested following 3 or 6 weeks were more confident in errors influenced by the con tradictory information than they were con fident in accurate recall. This finding sug gested to Spiro that the same reconstructive process was used to produce accurate and inaccurate recall; he concluded that errors were not produced at retrieval, through the use of a conscious guessing strategy, but re sulted from modification of the schema during storage.
The first purpose of this experiment was to determine if Spiro's results were valid under more stringent test conditions that in turn would provide more evidence con cerning the locus of schema change. The fact that Spiro did not request confidence ratings until after the story was recalled al lows for the possibility that subjects who were tested after longer delays had difficulty retrieving enough information from the story to comply with task demands, accessed the subsequent information, and consciously or unconsciously used it to elaborate their re call. Regardless of the nature of the re trieval processes, the test demands would require subjects to integrate all information to write a well-connected story. Thus, it is possible that the subsequent confidence ratings reflected integration at recall, as well as the type of retrieval processing.
The following experiment departs from Spiro in two important ways. First, a cued-recall task was employed to reduce the integrative demands of the test situation; if the errors observed by Spiro reflected pro cesses operating prior to retrieval, then the type of recall test should not affect the qualitative nature of the errors, although their magnitude may be decreased by the restrictive nature of the cues. Second, confidence ratings were requested immedi ately following each answer, requiring subjects to monitor their retrieval efforts. The second purpose of this experiment was to examine individual differences in re call accuracy from the theoretical perspec tive of schema change. Since research con cerned with knowledge structures places a large emphasis on idiosyncratic processing (Perfetti & Lesgold, 1977; Spiro, 1977) , it is reasonable to suggest that identifiable cog nitive styles may correspond to processes involved in schema change. Memory for events may be transformed according to the type of person who is processing the event.
Cognitive flexibility has been identified by Guilford (1967) as an important factor in discriminating among individual abilities. Defined as the ability to shift avenues of thinking in order to perceive and process information about a situation in different ways, cognitive flexibility is similar, on an intuitive level, to a description of schema change. In studies by Guilford and others (Houston & Mednick, 1963; Munsinger & Kessen, 1966; Vidler & Karan, 1975) , cog nitive flexibility has been associated with the ability to tolerate and structure ambiguity. Furthermore, Kaplan (1952) reported that subjects with a high tolerance for instability more readily recalled equivocal parts of stories than did other subjects. These findings suggest that at least one type of cognitive flexibility, spontaneous or adap tive, should be related to performance in this experiment.
Spontaneous flexibility is conceptualized as the ability to think in varied directions in an unstructured situation, such as the inci dental learning task in this experiment. Tests for spontaneous flexibility do not re quire flexibility for their solution, although the magnitude of the score depends on the spontaneous use of these processes. Simi-larly, the incidental nature of the subsequent information in this experiment does not re quire that it be kept separate from story in formation. The test for another subfactor, adaptive flexibility, does require flexible thought processes for problem solving, and therefore characterizes flexibility in situa tions that demand it. The test conditions of this experiment may be viewed as placing certain restrictions on subjects' recall. Logically, constructive effects that result from storage mechanisms should be related to spontaneous flexiblity, whereas those occurring at testing should be related to the amount of flexibility required by the recall task, and thus to adaptive flexibility. More generally, cognitive flexibility was expected to be a reliable predictor of memory perfor mance, in addition to the characteristics of the experimental setting.
Method

Materials
The material to be recalled was adapted from Spiro's (1975 Spiro's ( , 1977 passage about a young woman and man who met in college, developed a romantic relationship, and made marriage plans. The central theme of the story concerned the young man's desire not to have children and his hesitancy to inform the woman about this desire. He finally does tell her, and the story ends either with her sharing his desire not to have children because she had always wanted a career (harmony), or she becomes distraught by the news because she had always wanted a large family (conflict).
Test booklets consisted of 10 questions, prompts, or statements with a blank to be filled in; each of the 10 items was presented on a separate page. The first 5 filler items concerned details from the first part of the story, and answers were not viewed as potential sources of constructive errors. The remaining 5 items ad dressed the nature of the relationship, and were con structed to allow for intrusions emanating from the subsequent bias. All items are presented in the fol lowing display:
Cued Recall Test 1. When Bob and Margie met they were both ___ years old.
Bob was majoring in --·
3. Margie was majoring in --· 4. They didn't know each other until __ . !). Bob began to think he would like to marry Margie, after he had known her for --· 6. Margie's feelings about Bob could be characterized as:
7. When Bob asked Margie to marry him, she:
8. Bob and Margie's feelings about having children were:
9. What were Margie's goals for the future? 10. How did the story you read end?
For Items 6-10, a priori scoring continua were de veloped to reflect the direction of possible errors. Zero points were established for essentially accurate recall, the negative range was reserved for errors leading to a distortion of the conflict in the relationship, and the positive range was relegated to errors that would in crease the harmony. For Item 7 the continuum ranged from hesitancy to say yes ( -5 to -1), to acceptance (0), to enthusiasm ( + 1 to +5). Since magnitude was not considered as important an aspect of the replication as direction of error, the numerical value of the error score was not predetermined apart from establishing a posi tive correspondence between the degree of error and the magnitude of the score.
Two tests of spontaneous flexibility were employed (Object Naming and Utility). For the Object Naming test, subjects were required to name instances of each of two successively presented categories (liquids and plants), and scores were determined by the number of subcategorical shifts (from fruit juices to medications, e.g.). The Utility test was similar; subjects must name uses for each of two objects (brick and pencil), and the number of functional shifts was scored. For the Match test of adaptive flexibility, subjects were instructed to vary their solutions to the problem of removing a specified number of matches and leaving only matches that contributed to squares; scores were tabulated by counting the number of different solutions (removing corner matches vs. center matches, e.g.).
Subjects
Seventy students volunteered for two sessions, par ticipating in groups of 6-10 during the acquisition phase and 2-5 during the test phase. They received credit toward their introductory class grades. Groups were assigned to acquisition conditions on the basis of maintaining an equal male-female ratio across condi tions.
Procedure
All subjects were told that data would be collected for several short, unrelated experiments during the two sessions, and that all experiments would be explained at the end of the second session. Spiro's (1975) inci dental instructions for processing the story were then delivered:
This is an experiment concerned with changes in the way people react to stories involving interper sonal relations when there is a delay prior to giving the reactions. You will read a story about two peo ple. The story is true in all respects. I knew both of the people and can vouch for the accuracy of the story. What I would like you to do is think about and react to the story. At the second session I will ask you various kinds of questions concerning your reactions to the story. Are there any questions?
Subjects were told to use 3 minutes to read the story.
After the allotted time the stories were collected, and approximately 8 minutes were employed by assigning subjects to second-session dates, collecting phone numbers for reminder calls, and instructing subjects not to discuss the experiment between sessions. As the experimenter reviewed the story requirements for the second session, she very casually delivered one of the two types of subsequent bias. (a) Bob and Margie did get married and are very happy together to this day (harmony) or (b) they never did get married; the en gagement was broken, and they never saw each other again (conflict). Therefore, consistent and contradic tory subsequent information was presented to subjects reading each story end. For example, the harmonious bias was consistent with the harmonious story end and contradictory to the story end that reported conflict.
The Object Naming test, the Utility test, and the Match test were then administered in that order; pro cedures included reading the printed instructions aloud and observing the time limitations for each section. (For additional details, see French, Ekstrom, & Price, 1963.) Half of the subjects in each acquisition group re turned for testing 2 days later; the remaining subjects, after 3 weeks. The cover page of the test booklet con tained the following instructions, which were read aloud by the experimenter: I'm sorry, but we deceived you. This is not a study of how people react to situations involving interper sonal relations. It is a study of memory. As you will recall, at the last session you read a story. What we would like you to do is to try to recall the story as best you can. The following pages contain questions concerning the story you read. Base your answer to each question on your memory for the story and not on your personal reactions. You must answer every question, and you must answer them in the order in which they are presented. Do not look ahead or behind the question you are work ing on. After you have answered a question, please rate your confidence in the answer by placing a number on the line at the bottom of the page. Use the scale below. For example, if you write "1" you will be indicating that you are very uncertain that the meaning of the sentence you wrote was explicit ly expressed in the story, "5" will indicate moderate certainty, and "9" shows absolute certainty. Are there any questions?
Ten minutes were allowed for recall.
Results and Discussion
Cued Recall
Scoring. Two scorers, blind to the type of subsequent information and retention interval, independently determined error scores for Items 6-10. Agreement about direction of error was 100%; agreement about error magnitude was 89%. Where differ ences existed, their absolute value was 1, and all differences were resolved by the scorers so that complete agreement was finally reached.
The constructive error score (CES) for each subject was computed by subtracting from the individual item score with the highest absolute value the absolute value of the highest item score with the opposite sign. For example, if a set of item scores were 0, -3, 1, -1, 0, the CES would be -2. (Item scores of opposite directions rarely occurred within a subject's recall booklet.) This method of error scoring was chosen by Spiro (1975 Spiro ( , 1977 to reflect that evidence for reconstructive memory does not depend on the number of errors. Rather, it is deter mined by the magnitude of qualitative change, which may be as likely to occur in one sentence alone as in several sentences.
Constructive errors. Table 1 presents the mean CES for each condition of this exper iment, along with the means for the corre sponding free recall condition in Spiro's ex periment. The direction of errors (positive or negative) for cued recall are identical to those for free recall, with the exception of cells representing the harmonious story end, consistent subsequent information, 2-day delay. However, neither of these means is apparently different from zero.
For the cued-recall experiment, the major finding was that the type of subsequent in formation interacting with the length of the retention interval reliably influenced mem ory for the story. This interaction was tested by allowing for all other effects in the linear model, due to the nonorthogonality of the design (Appelbaum & Cramer, 1974) ; F(1, 62) = 11.237,MSe = .0084,p < .005. Of the remaining possible main effects and in teractions, only the main effect of the sub sequent information was reliable beyond the .10 level (allowing for the other effects), F(1, 62) = 39.574, MSe = .0084, p < .001. The interpretation of these effects is clear. When subsequent information indicated eventual disharmony (breaking up), subjects tended to impose or emphasize conflict in the story they read. When subsequent in formation indicated eventual harmony (marriage and happiness), conflict in the story was reduced or harmony was exagger ated. These effects obtained primarily after 3 weeks. Differences between the two experiments in magnitude of CES are apparent in Table  1 . For the 3-week contradictory condition, the magnitude of the cued-recall CES was lower than free-recall CES, indicating that the scoring procedure was perhaps more conservative, or that the cuing procedure in some way limited error magnitude. In ad dition, cued recall CES was greater for the 3-week consistent conditions than was free recall CES. This difference may be ac counted for by the change in scoring proce dures or by the possibility that in this ex periment the effect of consistent subsequent information was to exaggerate the harmony or conflict in the passage.
Confidence ratings. Spiro (1975) exam ined confidence ratings for sentences per taining only to the issue of having children; these sentences were presumed to be best examples for reflecting the subsequent bias. Only ratings for absolute error values of four or five were contrasted to ratings for error values of one or less. Spiro reasoned that if errors were a result of conscious fabrication, those that were greater in magnitude should be more easily detected. In the cued recall experiment, no responses to Item 8 (con cerning the issue of children) were given error scores large enough to adopt.Spiro's criterion. Indeed, it is questionable if re sponses to this item are comparable to the types of freely recalled sentences that were judged to concern the issue of having chil dren; the cuing procedure is quite likely more restrictive. Due to these differences in scoring and procedure, the locus of schema change was tested by comparing ratings for correct ver sus incorrect responses. Such a comparison should be a very conservative test of Spiro's locus hypothesis, in that higher ratings for nonextreme errors should reduce the dif ference between correct and incorrect re sponse ratings. All five responses were employed, since all five items were designed to reflect the incorporation of the subse quent information, and since they formed the basis of all prior analyses.
As can be seen in Table 2 , there was a slight tendency in all conditions for more subjects to rate correct responses higher than incorrect responses. (For Spiro's, 1975 , contradictory 3-week condition, the number of subjects showing greater confidence in incorrect responses was five times greater than those showing less or equal confidence.) Furthermore, for all 3-week subjects, confi dence in correct sentences was reliably greater than confidence in incorrect sen tences; paired-comparison t(25) = 3.230, SD = .409, p < .01. Since Spiro emphasized the rating comparison for subjects hearing con tradictory information, a separate test was performed for these subjects; once again, the results indicated that confidence for correct was greater than for incorrect recall, t(13) =: 2.923, SD = .491, p < .02. Therefore, subjects tested after 3 weeks could reliably distinguish between their errors and correct recall, when they were asked to do so im mediately after retrieving specific informa tion. However, these results do not dem onstrate that all reconstructive effects oc curred during retrieval; the mean difference in ratings between correct and incorrect was slightly greater than one. Nor do the results implicate a conscious guessing strategy; lower ratings could logically reflect the dif ficulty of retrieving and integrating poorly formulated aspects of story memory. Nev ertheless, the existence of a rating difference under the conditions of this' experiment makes it difficult to argue that all construc tive effects occurred during the retention interval, and not during the conscious pro cessing of story-related information. The most reasonable conclusion concerning these results, as well as the results of other exper iments demonstrating memory changes, is that changes occur due to processes operat ing at all stages of information processing, and are guided by the task demands.
Individual Differences
The second purpose of this experiment was to examine the relationship between constructive memory performance and scores on tests of cognitive flexibility. A multiple regression analysis was performed, using group membership variables (type of subsequent information, time of testing, and their interaction) and scores on the flexibil ity tests as predictors, and the absolute value of the largest error (AES) as the outcome measure. AES is the appropriate measure for the individual difference analyses be cause direction of error is no longer rele vant.
The most important finding was that the addition of the individual difference vari ables reliably increased the predictive ability of the regression equation, F(3, 63) = 3.195, SE = .012, p < .03; knowledge about differ ences in cognitive flexibility provided addi tional information about constructive error performance apart from knowing the pa rameters of the experimental situation.
The predictors with weights reliably dif ferent from zero were type of subsequent information, F(1, 63) = 5.305, SE = .162, p < .025; the Object Naming test, F(1, 63) = 4.438, SE = .048, p < .05; and the Match test, F(1, 63) = 5.176, SE = .039, p < .05. These three variables provided independent and reliable sources of information about the variance of AES performance. Since the magnitude of the standardized beta weights was approximately equal for the reliable predictors, interpreting the regression equation is straightforward: Occurrence of contradictory subsequent information and high scores on the adaptive flexibility test led to a greater degree of constructive error, and spontaneous flexibility was positively related to recall accuracy.
The relationships of the flexibility tests to constructive memory performance can be loosely interpreted as follows: Spontaneous flexibility appears to indicate individual abilities in maintaining separate memory stores for the experimental materials; after the influence of context was determined, subjects with higher scores more accurately recalled the story. Thus, spontaneously flexible individuals may tend to engage in less automatic restructuring of their expe rience. In addition, adaptive flexibility may be indicative of the tendency to combine separately stored information at retrieval, as a function of the amount of integration re quired by the task. Presumably, task de mands are a matter of individual perception; for those who perceived the cues as func tioning for the related information, adaptive flexibility predicted their tendency to in corporate it. More generally, support has been provided for the assumption that the two types of flexibility tests tap different characteristics of cognitive behavior.
Another possible view of the relationship of memory performance to flexibility scores is to attribute this relationship to a third variable, general intelligence. There are three objections to this approach. First, several sources have identified measures of flexibility as tapping individual character istics that are different from those charac teristics measured by intelligence tests (Anastasi & Schaefer, 1971; Lindeman & Fullagar, 1975; Yamamoto, 1965) . The re ported correlations are generally quite low (approximately .20), especially for individ uals with above average scores on intelli gence tests. Second, if the relationship re ported in this study could be partially ac counted for by a general intelligence factor, even less information about individual dif ferences in recall accuracy would be ob tained. This argument is based on the issue of intelligence testing and what it tells us about specific abilities. Guilford's factor analytic approach to intelligence, as well as the individual-difference approach of cog nitive psychology, emphasizes a detailed analysis of individual characteristics and a convergence of these characteristics with behaviors in certain experimental settings.
Finally, Meehl (1970) has called attention to the fallacy of using a third factor as a co variate for investigating relationships be tween a naturally occurring characteristic and some outcome variable. In the present study, removing the variance accounted for by a general intelligence factor would auto matically allow some unknown fourth factor to systematically affect the relationship be tween flexibility and recall. In summary, the relationship between cognitive flexibility and recall merits attention in its own right, apart from investigating the more general relationship between intelligence and me morial performance.
Conclusions
The cued-recall results of this experiment are consistent with Spiro's (1975 Spiro's ( , 1977 findings concerning the influence of subse quent information on memory for an event.
As the testing interval increased, the mag nitude of constructive errors increased, and their direction reflected the nature of the subsequent information. However, after 3 weeks, subjects indicated more· confidence in correctly recalled sentences than in sen tences containing errors. This difference in recall confidence probably indicates that either some constructive effects occurred during retrieval or subjects engaged a con scious guessing strategy. At the very least, both types of recall were not produced by directly accessing a stable, well-integrated schema for ·all information related to the story.
Second, the relationships between cogni tive flexibility and constructive errors may illuminate the issue concerning the locus of constructive effects. Both the terms used to distinguish the two types of flexibility tests and the nature of the tasks employed suggest that spontaneous flexibility may indicate a reduced tendency to restructure experience, whereas adaptive flexibility inay correspond to characteristics of integrative recall. Thus, the tests of cognitive flexibility may be rel atively independent, and furthermore, they may reflect relatively independent process ing with regard to storage and retrieval of real world information.
Finally, this research has implications for educational theory and practice. Spiro (1977) has suggested that an emphasis on knowledge updating (incorporating new in formation into previous structures) rather than isolation for the purpose of test taking (as in typical memory experiments) could provide for richer, more particularized in terpretations of information. In a general sense, such an emphasis may encourage in-. accurate memory of specific information but increase the tendency to approach learning and testing situations with a more flexible cognitive set. The results from this experi ment further suggest that knowledge struc tures are modified both during storage and when information from the structures is re trieved. In addition, individuals probably differ according to the conditions under which they modify their schemata for events, and one way of specifying this difference is in terms of cognitive flexibility.
